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Contracting for Privacy Precaution  
(and a Laffer Curve for Crime)
Ian Ayres
ABSTRACT
While Internet consumers and retailers have incentives to contract to protect against criminal 
privacy invasions by third parties, externality and observability concerns may limit contractual 
precaution mandates. Contracting between consumers and retailers operates, however, in the 
shadow of government efforts to deter cybercrime—which in turn can influence the equilibrium 
information-sharing activity levels as well as private precaution efforts taken by consumers and 
retailers. This article argues that there is a criminal analog to the Laffer curve. Just as citizens’ 
reaction to taxation policy raises the possibility that, over some range, lower tax rates may 
produce higher government revenues, citizens’ reaction to penal policies raises the possibility 
that, over some range, higher penalties may produce more crime.  Though victims and thieves 
may be made better off by a “higher crime–higher penalty” equilibrium, these private benefits 
must be measured against (among other things) the social costs of additional state effort.
1. INTRODUCTION
While many articles in this issue discuss the efficiency of contracts au-
thorizing retailers to use consumers’ data, another important use of con-
tracts involves precautionary promises by both consumers and retailers to 
prevent unauthorized third parties from obtaining and using this infor-
mation. This type of unauthorized theft of information is an important 
species of cybercrime.
When a third party hacks into a user’s account and not only gains ac-
cess to the user’s personal data such as passwords and profile information 
but also gains the ability to direct purchases to the hacker’s own benefit, 
the user loses autonomy and self-authorship. Identity theft is not just a 
species of privacy invasion; it is a violation that is often much worse than 
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the misappropriation concerns that arise when retailers repurpose con-
sumers’ information without sufficient consent. And unlike retailer mis-
appropriation, third-party misappropriation often results in financial as 
well as autonomy-related costs. Lifelock earns more than $400 million 
annually for a service that purports to reduce the likelihood of identity 
theft. But there is no Lifelock for privacy—that is, no comparably suc-
cessful service to protect against improvident retailer misappropriation of 
users’ information.
This article explores how contracting between consumers and retailers 
affects precaution taking and how this interacts with government pol-
icies to influence the prevalence of cybercrime. In particular, it is pos-
ited that higher penalties may (counterintuitively) produce more crime 
and that both consumers and retailers may benefit from this relatively 
greater prevalence. This benefit, however, must be measured against the 
costs of implementing and enforcing additional penalties. This argument 
is organized into two parts: the first part discusses the precaution-taking 
incentives and provisions in consumer-seller contracts and the possibil-
ity that externality and observability constraints will produce suboptimal 
precaution levels. The second part explores how this equilibrium between 
consumers’ and retailers’ behaviors is likely to be influenced by differ-
ent  levels of government precaution taking and whether different policies 
could nudge precaution-taking behavior in desired directions.
2. PRECAUTION TAKING ARISING FROM THE CONSUMER-RETAILER CONTRACT
Contracts between Internet consumers and retailers can reduce the likeli-
hood of cybercrime by mandating that both consumers and retailers take 
precautions to prevent it. For example, when a website requires that a 
user register with a password that is at least eight characters and contains 
at least one uppercase letter, one lowercase letter, and one number, the 
seller is requiring, as a prerequisite to contracting, that the consumer en-
gage in precaution taking that exceeds the level that the consumer would 
otherwise have chosen. These precaution mandates alter consumers’ be-
havior. There is strong empirical evidence that a substantial number of 
users, left to their own devices, would choose extremely weak passwords. 
Users often use identical passwords across multiple accounts (Ives, Walsh, 
and Schneider 2004; Bang et al. 2012). In addition, passwords are fre-
quently based on information about an individual that is publicly avail-
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able and easily found (including a pet’s name, a birthday, a child’s name, 
or a mother’s maiden name) or on widely familiar words and symbols 
(Nelson and Vu 2010).
An important reason for weak, low-entropy passwords is that con-
sumers do not internalize all the costs of cybercrime. An individual con-
sumer who chooses an easily defeated password puts not just her own 
privacy at risk but also the interests of others. Other consumers’ identities 
are put at risk because there are fixed costs to hacking, and one consum-
er’s negligence improves the joint return on a criminal’s investment. One 
consumer’s failure to take precaution (for example, failing to fix a bro-
ken window) can influence the chance that another consumer will be vic-
timized (password precaution taking bears similarities to some auto-theft 
precautions; see Ayres and Levitt 1998). Retailers often bear the costs of 
reversing fraudulent transactions and resetting accounts, as well as repu-
tational costs when their customers’ accounts are hacked. The fraud in-
surance offered by retailers exacerbates consumers’ moral hazard with re-
gard to precaution taking—as witnessed in the greater reluctance of some 
consumers to share their Social Security numbers than their more-insured 
credit card numbers.1 Thus, while consumers often experience the pass-
word requirements as a hassle, the retailer is well placed to trade off this 
dissatisfaction against the benefits of increased deterrence.2
An analogous story can be told with regard to sellers’ precaution 
taking. Sellers, like consumers, do not by themselves internalize all the 
consequences of cybercrime attacks against their users but through the 
process of contracting are often willing to take on duties of precaution 
taking. The implementation of certification and secure payment systems 
(such as secure sockets layer certificates, Payment Card Industry Data Se-
curity Standards, or the HTTPS lock icon) can impose costs on retailers3 
but provide a potential benefit to consumers (and thus to the consumer- 
retailer pair).
1. This occurs even though Social Security numbers can be more at risk of third-party 
prediction than credit card numbers (Moore 2011–12). Starting with an individual’s place 
and date of birth—at times knowable from a Facebook profile—a Social Security number 
can be probabilistically predicted by analyzing publicly available data containing the So-
cial Security numbers of dead people.
2. The password mandates are just one way that sellers encourage consumers’ pass-
word protection. The end-user license agreements at times incentivize consumer precau-
tion by shifting liability “for loss of passwords due to user negligence” (Heartland Pay-
ment Systems 2016).
3. See, for example, Payment Card Information Security Standards Council, Securing 
the Future of Payments Together (https://pcisecuritystandards.org/).
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 The consumer and retailer jointly, through their contract, are there-
fore better placed to internalize more of the consequences of cybercrime. 
But to say that the consumer and seller are jointly better placed to trade 
off the costs and benefits of precaution taking is not to say that we should 
expect their contracts to impose optimal precaution levels. There are at 
least two reasons why we might expect that consumer-seller contracts 
would fail to incentivize sufficient precaution taking: uninternalized con-
sequences and unobservable counterparty behaviors.
First, consider residual externalities. While there are often gains to 
trade in agreements imposing higher levels of precaution taking by both 
consumers and sellers, there are still consequences to cybercrime that 
are not internalized even by specific consumer-seller pairs. When Ashley 
Madison is hacked, consumers of other adultery websites (for example, 
Seekingarrangement.com) may become more reluctant to contract. News 
of cybercrime may therefore dampen commerce and impose costs beyond 
just the targeted retailer. Indeed, the consequences may be felt even in 
wildly different markets. The theft of consumer data from Target, for 
example, may make consumers generally more cautious about electronic 
transactions, impacting people beyond just those who had accounts at 
the compromised site and influencing their behaviors at websites even in 
different markets.
These inter- and intraindustry externalities also suggest that the 
employer- employee contracts may not mandate sufficient employee (or 
employer) precaution. In retail, mass loss of information from consum-
ers’ accounts is often caused by employee negligence. For example, after 
T. J. Maxx compromised the credit card information of 94 million cus-
tomers, class- action litigation alleged that the retailer was responsible for 
employee negligence that led to the hacking (Schneider 2009). If the seller 
does not bear all the benefits of deterring the theft of information but 
bears all the costs of deterring the theft, we should expect undersupply of 
industry precaution against such hacks. The wholesale loss of consumers’ 
identity information is an even larger policy concern than the retail con-
cern of negligence of individual users to keep their passwords nonpublic.
The second reason for suboptimal precaution taking is the presence 
of counterparty behaviors that are difficult for the counterparty to ob-
serve, much less verify to an enforcing court. There are important ob-
servability limits to the kinds of precautionary obligations that a contract 
can impose on both consumers and retailers. The “contract” can require 
consumers to select strong passwords as a prerequisite to placing an or-
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der, but sellers have a much harder time observing whether consumers 
have taken adequate care in keeping such information secure. Consumers 
who keep their passwords on easily found Post-its (hereafter, Post-it neg-
ligence) or who email their passwords to themselves or friends weaken 
the security of even very strong passwords.4
There is an inescapable tension between the kinds of consumer pre-
caution that retailers can enforce and those that they cannot. Requiring 
nonintuitive passwords—for example, with numbers and punctuation 
marks—naturally makes it harder for consumers to remember their pass-
words and hence can lead the consumers to keep a written record of a 
password in a place that is sufficiently accessible for ready use. Requir-
ing more precaution with regard to password entropy is thus very likely 
to induce less precaution with regard to consumers keeping a harder- 
to-remember password private. Given this tradeoff between password 
strength and Post-it negligence, it is somewhat surprising that more re-
tailers do not leverage the beneficial inertia of default settings by offering 
passwords with higher entropy and easier-to-remember mnemonics—that 
is, by issuing an initial well-designed password that can be changed only 
with additional user effort.5
Another important unobservable behavior that can produce sub-
optimal precaution taking is the use by consumers of the same password 
on multiple websites. Because of consumers’ tendency to reuse pass-
words, a breach of security at one site might give thieves the log-in infor-
mation for a variety of other platforms. For example, Das et al. (2014, 
p. 1) find that “43–51% of users reuse the same password across multiple 
sites” and that a cross-site password-guessing algorithm “is able to guess 
30% of transformed passwords within 100 attempts.” A website’s secu-
rity might thus be significantly compromised by a breach of security at 
other websites. Password reuse is not only difficult for an individual site 
to observe; it also produces another externality reason as to why all the 
consequences of a security breach are not borne by the site that fails to 
protect its users’ log-in information.
An individual website could take action against consumers’ reuse of 
passwords by imposing idiosyncratic password requirements (for exam-
ple, use of an internal numeral) that forces users to at least slightly modify 
4. Improvements in biometric verification of identity (for example, by fingerprint or 
iris imaging) may radically reduce the prevalence of Post-it negligence.
5. My Crossfit Wodify account did this by initially choosing “doghappy34” as my 
default password, for example.
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their standard password choices when registering for the site. Such idio-
syncratic requirements might reduce password reuse negligence but again 
exacerbate the Post-it negligence mentioned above.6 Alternatively, a web-
site might require a user to promise not to reuse a password when regis-
tering and to give permission to verify compliance by allowing the retailer 
to log in on behalf of the consumer at other Internet venues. Someone 
from stickK should not be able to log in at other sites using your stickK 
email and password combination. Or at the time of registering, the stickK 
system might test a dozen other sites and reject any password that gains 
admission at other Internet platforms. One might even imagine retailer 
sites bringing suit against other sites that negligently allow the release 
of passwords that are likely known to be prone to reuse. For example, if 
Amazon could prove an increase in fraudulent transactions on accounts 
with users who also had been victims of a negligent release of data by an-
other website, Amazon might reasonably claim to bear costs of the other 
site’s negligence.
Finally, analogous problems of observability apply to sellers’ precau-
tion taking. Sellers’ precaution taking, including precaution taking by re-
tailers’ employees, with regard to consumers’ account information, log-in 
passwords, and credit cards, is largely a credence good. Individual con-
sumers are ill-equipped to monitor and enforce contractual conditions. 
While third-party verification schemes may mitigate this problem, it also 
merely displaces the credence problem to another level.
In short, there are important aspects of consumers’ behavior with re-
gard to password reuse and password posting that are difficult for sellers 
to observe (much less verify to courts) and that thus preclude effective 
contracting. These noncontractible dimensions combined with the sub-
stantial consequences external to consumer-users predictably lead to sub-
optimal precaution taking by consumers.
3. A LAFFER CURVE OF (CYBER)CRIME
The foregoing analysis of private precautions takes as given particular 
levels of public precaution taking and government enforcement efforts, 
including expected punishments. Government enforcement efforts, of 
course, can vary and affect private precaution taking in important ways. 
6. The reuse of security questions creates an analogous precaution externality. If 
hackers of one site learn answers to standard security questions (what was your first pet’s 
name, in what city were you born), they may gain access to other otherwise secure sites.
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As Peltzman (1975) shows, for example, government-mandated precau-
tion taking (for example, mandatory seatbelt wearing) can induce lower 
levels of private precaution taking (for example, safe driving).7 In this sec-
tion, I want to emphasize the interaction between the level of government 
precaution taking and the level of private precaution taking and private 
activity levels—both in contracting and in the amount of private informa-
tion that consumers are willing to share with retailers (such as providing 
their credit card information, Social Security number, or friends’ contact 
information).
My organizing analogy is to the Laffer curve: the Laffer curve—an 
example of which is in Figure 1—captures the notion that total revenues 
can decline, even as tax rates increase, beyond some sufficiently high 
level. The perverse (or downward-sloping) portion of the curve is due 
to the distortionary effect of the tax on the underlying activity. The un-
derlying logic long predates Laffer’s graphic representation. For exam-
ple, as explained by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, no. 21, “If 
duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; 
and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined 
within proper and moderate bounds” (Bartlett 2012, p. 1208).8 In other 
7. Peltzman (1975) describes the phenomenon wherein individuals adjust their behav-
ior in response to the perceived level of risk, becoming more careful where they sense 
greater risk and less careful if they feel more protected, which results in a lower net ben-
efit than expected.
8. Bartlett (2012) details that a host of writers, including the 14th-century philoso-
pher Ibn Khaldun, Jonathan Swift, Adam Smith, and John C. Calhoun, understood that 
immoderately high tax rates could reduce total tax revenues.
Figure 1. A Laffer curve
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words, when taxes are too high, the curtailing reaction of private parties 
to the tax may so reduce commerce, in Hamilton’s example import du-
ties, that total tax revenue collected can decrease. The same might occur 
with income taxes. Just as the reduction of consumption activity can lead 
to the downward-sloping portion of the tariff Laffer curve, the reduction 
of work activity can lead to the downward-sloping part of the income-tax 
Laffer curve. The tax rate at which total tax revenue actually declines is 
disputed especially by politicians.
The Laffer curve has been applied to a few nontax contexts. For ex-
ample, Claessens (1990) and others redeploy the idea in the context of 
country indebtedness to propose an analogous debt Laffer curve relation-
ship between the nominal value of a country’s debt and the total market 
value of the debt.
Here I want to suggest that there is also what might be thought of as a 
crime Laffer curve. As shown in Figure 2, the Laffer curve of crime relates 
the total amount of some particular crime to the expected punishment 
that an individual lawbreaker can expect to receive from breaking the 
law in question.
Like the original application to tax, the crime Laffer curve’s perversity 
stems from the impact of the X-axis variable (the tax rate) on an under-
lying activity level. Where the perverse slope of the tax Laffer curve is the 
possibility of the downward-sloping portion of the curve when the value 
of the X-axis variable is high, the perverse slope of the crime Laffer curve 
is the upward-sloping portion of the curve when the value of the X-axis 
variable, the expected punishment in this case, is low.
The perverse possibility that, over some range, higher levels of ex-
Figure 2. A Laffer curve of crime
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pected punishment could increase the amount of crime stems from the 
possibility that, at very low levels of expected punishment, potential vic-
tims may reduce the activity levels that make them susceptible to victim-
ization. For example, imagine there were very low expected penalties for 
mugging someone in the park at night. We might expect that few people 
would venture into the park at night. If government increased the ex-
pected punishment (by either increasing the probability of apprehension 
and conviction or by increasing the severity of the sanction conditional 
on conviction), potential victims might feel sufficiently safe to start re-
turning to the park at night. Under such conditions, it is possible that in-
creasing the expected punishment would lead to an increase in nighttime 
muggings.
From the perspective of the criminal, the perverse upward-sloping 
portion of the Laffer curve turns crime into a kind of Giffen good for 
which increasing the price (sanction) increases the quantity that criminals 
buy (commit). But whereas Giffen goods represent contexts in which the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect, the upward slope of the 
crime Laffer curve represents a context in which the victims’ activity- level 
effect dominates the deterrence effect on criminals.
As the mugging example suggests, the possibility of a crime Laffer 
curve is not limited to cybercrime. But there are reasons to believe that 
the conditions of the perverse upward slope might be especially relevant 
with regard to the willingness of consumers to share their private infor-
mation online with retailers. Some consumers have shown reluctance to 
engage in online commerce because they do not trust the retailers to keep 
their credit card information secure, even though they trust the servers 
at restaurants and other brick-and-mortar establishments. Other con-
sumers are unwilling to save their credit card information with retailers 
or Internet providers for ease of subsequent purchases. Some users have 
furthermore (reasonably) sacrificed some features of smartphone appli-
cations (or the use of the applications altogether) because they are un-
willing to log in through Facebook and possibly share their Facebook 
contact lists (Chatfield and Häkkilä 2004). In all of these circumstances, 
some parts of the online community may have seemed to some consum-
ers like the nighttime park—a place where they refuse to go. The reduc-
tion in certain forms of online commercial activity might accordingly lead 
to the upward-slope perversity in which increasing the expected sanction 
(and therefore expected safety of the place) may lead to an increase in 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.166 on May 22, 2018 10:51:11 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
S132 /  T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  L E G A L  S T U D I E S  /  V O L U M E  4 5  ( 2 )  /  J U N E  2 0 1 6
total crime because of the disproportionate effect on consumers’ activity 
(Smith and Vásquez 2015).9
So far, my use of the Laffer curve analogy has been descriptive. But 
there is an implicit normative corollary to the tax Laffer curve. If a policy 
maker finds herself on the perverse slope of the tax curve, she should re-
duce the tax rate. With apologies to the Sound of Music, the Laffer logic 
suggests that policy makers should “climb every perverse slope.” In other 
words, if the tax rate is so high that it is depressing tax revenues, the tax 
rate should be lowered—doing so not only increases government revenue 
but also reduces the distortionary effect on taxpayers’ behavior and al-
lows them to retain more of their income.10
The Laffer analogy to crime would be less powerful if it were merely 
descriptive. But it turns out that a weaker form of this normative cor-
ollary (of climbing the perverse slope) for policy makers carries over to 
the criminal context: if a policy maker finds herself on the perverse-slope 
portion of Figure 2—that is, in that region wherein a move to increase the 
expected penalty for a crime also increases the incidence of that crime—
the policy maker might at least presumptively consider increasing the ex-
pected penalty. Indulging even a rebuttable presumption of taking action 
to increase the amount of victimization from crime is normatively per-
verse. But to the extent that the upward-sloping portion of the crime Laf-
fer curve is caused by changes in potential victims’ activity levels, policy 
makers have reason to believe that the move to more crime benefits po-
tential victims.
With regard to the mugging example, the perverse upward slope is 
caused by potential victims’ willingness to return to the park, as per-
ceived safety increases with expected sanctions. This increased activity 
level, in turn, induces higher amounts of crime. But the fact that potential 
victims return to the park reveals their preference to use the park more, 
even though doing so subjects them to a higher chance of victimization. 
Potential victims—after all—retain the ability to preclude the increase in 
crime (notwithstanding the increase in expected penalties) by simply con-
9. Smith and Vásquez (2015) formally model the equilibrium interaction among the 
expected penalty, citizens’ precaution, and the level of crime and provide conditions un-
der which an upward slope might pertain.
10. How far one should decrease the tax rate is less clear, however. Climbing to the 
top of the curve so as to maximize government revenue may not maximize efficiency. But 
following the Laffer logic that there are always (at least) two tax rates that will produce 
any given level of revenue, it should be clear that between (or among) equivalent tax-
revenue- generating rates, the lower (lowest) rate is more (most) efficient.
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tinuing to eschew the park. In other words, if they wanted to ensure their 
safety, they could just refuse to use the park.
Going to the park can be seen as both an increase in activity level and 
a reduction in basic precaution, but higher expected sanctions on perpe-
trators can also affect other forms of potential victims’ precaution taking, 
such as keeping one’s phone out of sight or walking briskly. A substitu-
tion between government and private precaution can have an analogous 
Laffer effect, as increased government enforcement may lead to reduced 
private precaution taking in ways that increase the equilibrium level of 
crime. The net effect on crime may turn, inter alia, on whether public and 
private precaution taking are strategic complements or substitutes (Bu-
low, Geanakopolis, and Klemperer 1985).
The preference of the populace inferred from activity and precaution 
choices for increased chance of victimization suggests that potential vic-
tims are presumptively better off by the increase in crime.11 Of course, 
this revealed-preference argument depends on potential victims being suf-
ficiently informed and rational about the expected risk of returning to the 
park (or to cyberspace). Government precautions—like the sellers’ pre-
cautions mentioned earlier—are credence goods; it is difficult (if not im-
possible) for potential victims (like consumers) to monitor and measure 
their implementation and effectiveness to the degree necessary to make 
a completely informed decision. One important criticism of broken- 
windows initiatives is that they may mislead citizens into thinking that 
a renovated park is safer than it really is (Harcourt 2001). Even if the 
choice to return to the park (or e-commerce) itself is made under circum-
stances of incomplete or imperfect information, the choice nonetheless 
can provide evidence about what individuals expect will increase their 
utility.
Assuming hyperrational and perfectly informed citizens at best leads 
to nothing more than a policy presumption to climb toward more crime, 
because the foregoing revealed-preference argument leaves unaddressed 
the costs of increasing the expected sanctions. Even if citizens are made 
better off by moving to a portion of the curve with higher expected sanc-
11. An analogous story might be told with regard to other forms of public safety reg-
ulation that might increase citizens’ activity levels. Thus, for example, a highway safety 
design mandate that so enhances the number of miles driven that it increases the number 
of car fatalities might be deemed, for analogous reasoning, to presumptively make drivers 
better off.
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tions,12 it is unclear whether those private benefits outweigh the social 
costs of higher expected sanctions. Moving to the right in Figure 2 nor-
mally will require hiring more police or prosecutors (to increase the prob-
ability of apprehension and conviction) or incurring more prison costs 
(to increase the penalty to those convicted). Any choice to increase the 
expected sanctions, therefore, should consider whether the presumptive 
benefit to potential victims is outweighed by the social costs of enhanced 
penalties.
Finally and most perversely, the undersupply of government precau-
tion might ameliorate the undersupply of precaution produced by private 
contracting. While standard modeling of the interaction between gov-
ernment and citizens’ precaution efforts assumes that citizens make op-
timal precaution decisions conditional on government action (Smith and 
Vásquez 2015), the first part of this argument suggests reasons why pri-
vate contracting might produce suboptimal precaution given any particu-
lar level of government effort. Thus, the lessons of the two parts together 
might suggest that undersupply of government effort (such as through re-
duced expected punishments) might give rise to offsetting increases in pri-
vate precaution taking. Therefore, even though third-party exploitation 
of password reuse (via Das et al. [2014] password-guessing algorithms) is 
the type of conduct that violates the core of the federal Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030 [1986]), a less aggressive policy of en-
forcement might beneficially induce websites to guide users toward less 
reuse.
4. CONCLUSION
Section 2 argued that we might expect the level of precaution taking by 
consumers and sellers, with regard to online privacy, to be suboptimal 
(for any given level of expected government criminal enforcement) be-
cause of externalities and the existence of noncontractible behaviors. Sec-
tion 3 used a Laffer curve to argue that when expected penalties are un-
usually low, potential victims might respond by reducing their activity 
levels by abandoning cyberspaces or failing to share otherwise valuable 
12. While it is standard to discount the utility of the criminals, there is an analogous 
revealed-preference argument that consumers are made better off by moving up the per-
verse slope. Notwithstanding the increased activity level of citizens in the park, the crim-
inals might have chosen not to mug—which indicates that they are better off mugging 
than not mugging (which is what they did when sanctions were lower).
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information (such as credit card or contact details) because of concerns 
about safety. In such contexts, the welfare of the public (including both 
retailers and consumers) might be enhanced by a move toward higher 
penalties, despite the rise in crime that may result.
As in other contexts, however, the theoretical possibility of a Laf-
fer curve perversity fails to provide concrete policy help. The normative 
payoff of a rebuttable presumption is of little use if policy makers are 
unable to divine whether the environment is operating at the upward- 
sloping portion. The most helpful clue would be for policy makers to 
look for massive activity-level effects whereby a substantial proportion 
of consumers decline for safety concerns to share what would otherwise 
seem to be valuable information. Even if policy makers were somewhat 
confident that the status quo policies placed the world on the perverse 
slope, it would be extremely unlikely that it would be possible to assess 
whether the private benefits from increased government effort would be 
worth the costs, especially given the results in Section 2 that showed that 
the private sector would undersupply precautionary contracting. In the 
end, the payoff of this piece is at most to suggest why efficiency analyses 
of cybercrime policies and marginal changes to such policies are likely to 
be infeasible.
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